Peru bears wounds that have never healed. The scars of the internal armed conflict and the Fujimori dictatorship have left a democracy reeling, plagued by mistrust and disillusionment. These wounds, which seemed to have been relegated to the past, continue to beat strongly in every repressed protest, in every delegitimized march, in every act of resistance that is branded as subversion. Since 2016, the crisis facing the country has become evident: six presidents, three congresses and a constant struggle for power have blurred the foundations of an already fragile institutional framework.

The current Boluarte government represents the climax of this crisis. The administration is perceived as the result of years of corruption, repression and criminalization. Since her rise to power in December 2022, following the ousting of President Castillo, Peru has experienced an unprecedented escalation of social tension. Mass protests demanding new elections, justice and structural change were repressed: more than 60 deaths, thousands injured, hundreds criminalized and a country divided between those demanding justice and those justifying repression in the name of order.

Cruz, a lawyer for “Human Rights Without Borders” with whom we spoke for this blog, points out that this crisis is cumulative and not exclusive to the current government. Since the end of Fujimori’s dictatorship, Peru has oscillated between various failed paths of reconstruction. The decision to build a state based on the constitution of the dictatorship has perpetuated inequalities and conflicts, while the setbacks in collective rights show the state’s inability to address structural problems.

Why is it important to guarantee the right to protest?

The right to social protest consists of “a form of individual or collective action aimed at expressing ideas, visions or values of dissent, opposition, denunciation or vindication” according to the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression-RELE of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The political constitutions of Latin American countries have incorporated the protection of this right into their internal legal systems, and although in the case of some countries this right is not explicit, we can deduce it from their jurisprudence.

According to Lalinde in El elogio a la bulla (2019), the right to protest constitutes an essential pillar of democratic societies, ensuring that groups historically excluded from decision-making, such as women, indigenous peoples, LGBTQ+ people, among others, have guarantees to raise their voices. This right strengthens citizen participation and promotes the construction of more inclusive societies that are more respectful of diversity of opinion.

However, this recognition at the regulatory level has not been enough to protect the exercise of the right to social protest in practice and its relationship with the exercise of other rights such as freedom of expression, the right to life and personal integrity, or equality and non-discrimination.

Criminalization against indigenous and peasant people: the case of young people in Cusco

In December 2022, multiple protests took place due to the political crisis. In the Cusco region, as in other parts of the country, thousands of people took to the streets. Young people, many of them from peasant and indigenous communities, were a key part of these mobilizations, and they also became the target of violent repression by the forces of order.

Richard Camala, Ferdinán Huaccanqui, Redy Huamán and Joel Hivallanca, four young people from the district of Pisac, province of Calca, department of Cusco, all from the Cuyo Grande Peasant Community, joined the demonstrations. On January 31, 2023, they were arrested and accused of committing the crimes of rioting and obstructing the functioning of public services, despite there being insufficient evidence to directly link them to the crimes. They were sentenced to between six and seven years in prison, along with a significant civil compensation payment ($21,585.00 US dollars). The criminalization of these young people became an emblematic case of how social protests, especially those led by indigenous and peasant communities, are brutally repressed.

Vera, also a lawyer for “Human Rights Without Borders”, who have accompanied the judicial process, indicates that the process has been full of irregularities since the arrest and that, furthermore, the crimes charged and the sentence are absolutely disproportionate. In his words, “this sentence is riddled with nullity.” In fact, the young people pleaded guilty, due to poor advice from those who were acting as their legal defense at the time, who assured them that this would allow them to be released. However, this did not happen and in the end they were convicted without the evidence being verified.

This case, as well as showing how the Peruvian state has been strengthening strategies to criminalize social protest, also reflects a deep problem of structural racism, where indigenous and peasant communities, historically marginalized, face a double stigmatization: for their ethnic origin and for their political activism. The institutional violence against these young people highlights the social and political exclusion they suffer in a country that continues to suffer from strong inequalities. The disproportionate action on the part of the police force is reflected both in the repression of the protest and in its subsequent criminalization.

In the process, the young people of Cusco were treated without an intercultural approach, even though they belong to a peasant and indigenous community. For example, there was no Quechua interpreter even though this is the young people’s mother tongue. In Vera’s words, “they didn’t get on very well in Spanish, they hardly spoke at all, but they did more in Quechua. This is a fundamental right, that they be tried in their mother tongue which they speak, and even more so if they are to acknowledge responsibility and explain the consequences of the responsibility they are accepting”.

Furthermore, the money they have been forced to pay takes no account of their socioeconomic circumstances. In the same vein, Vera argues that “this civil reparation is totally disproportionate for them, as they cannot raise money because they do not work in commerce, but in farming, growing their own produce, mainly in agriculture”.

Law No. 32183, the “security” excuse for criminalizing protest

Cases such as that of the young people of Cusco are not isolated; on the contrary, they reflect a constant throughout the country, where social and political fractures are intertwined with a growing sense of citizen insecurity. In this context, far from implementing effective public policies against insecurity, the State has chosen to exploit this problem. Using the pretext of security, it has intensified the criminalization of protest, a strategy that is in line with trends observed in other governments with authoritarian tendencies. The enactment of Law No. 32183 in November 2024 is evidence of this. The wording of the law leaves dangerously open the possibility that acts of protest, such as roadblocks or the occupation of public spaces, could be considered extortion. It also prevents civil servants from joining strikes in other sectors, stating that they will not be able to continue exercising their position.

Let’s imagine a common scenario: peasants and indigenous people block a road, not on a whim, but because the decisions made in Lima have ignored their needs. Under this law, these acts would be extortion. This approach not only stigmatizes social protest, but also builds a wall between the state and its citizens, treating legitimate demands that are collectively claimed in the public space as threats to order.

This law institutionalizes this type of injustice. Rather than protecting public order, it reinforces a system that seeks to demobilize the most vulnerable sectors. In a country where approximately 60% of protests are linked to socio-environmental conflicts, and these mostly take place in peasant and indigenous communities, it is a tool to silence the demands of those who see their territories threatened and their rights trampled on.

Cruz emphasizes that this proposal does not respond to a lack of legislation against insecurity, since the existing legal system is sufficient. Instead, the initiative seems to aim to restrict rights in the context of social protest.

Closure of civic space and the danger to democracy

The law and the case of the young people of Cusco are examples of how the criminalization of protest limits citizen participation. What does this mean for Peruvian democracy? It means that the State not only represses, but also legislates against the exercise of fundamental rights. It also means that protest is no longer seen as a pillar of democracy but as a threat that must be contained. In recent months, Peru has not had any more mass protests at the national level, however, there are protests with a regional context that are still in danger due to the closing of spaces.

In Peru and Latin America, the protection of civic space is essential to strengthen democracy and ensure that the most vulnerable voices, often from historically marginalized communities, are heard without fear of reprisal. It is therefore essential that not only the right to protest, but all fundamental rights and freedoms, be respected and protected. Democracy flourishes with respect for diversity of opinion and the guarantee of human rights, not with the repression and criminalization of those who raise their voices in search of political and social transformation.