CELAC-EU: Cooperation Trapped in Prohibitionism

On the eve of the CELAC-EU Summit in Santa Marta, the geopolitical landscape is marked by serious tensions. According to the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), as of November 4, the United States has bombed more than 16 vessels in the Pacific and Caribbean, claiming they were transporting drugs, killing 67 people. These attacks, contrary to international law, open a new and deadly chapter in the failed war on drugs and prohibitionist approaches that have caused more harm than solutions.

In this context, the issue of drugs will be unavoidable on the Santa Marta agenda. While some Latin American countries such as Colombia, Mexico, and Bolivia have led proposals for reform and revision of the international control regime in recent years, Europe faces a growing inconsistency between its progressive rhetoric and its security practices. The thesis of this article is that bi-regional cooperation on drugs remains asymmetrical and unfair, trapped in a prohibitionist paradigm that reproduces inequalities and blocks alternatives.

To demonstrate this, two dimensions will be addressed: (1) the recent history of efforts and contradictions in both regions and (2) the elements that could shape a more just and evidence-based bi-regional agenda.

1.   Latin American reformism and European ambiguity: between progress and contradictions

 In recent years, Latin America has led the global drug reform agenda. Since UNGASS 2016, promoted by Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala, the region has succeeded in including human rights and public health language in the international control system for the first time. Subsequently, through Colombia’s leadership, a coalition of more than 60 countries was consolidated in 2024, raising serious questions about the results of the global control system. Then, in 2025, Colombia again promoted the creation of an independent panel to review the international drug regime, adopted by the CND with 30 votes in favor and only three against. Subsequently, Colombia consolidated a coalition of more than 60 countries that promoted the creation of an independent panel to review the international drug regime in 2025, adopted by the CND with 30 votes in favor and only three against.

Simultaneously, Bolivia has led the critical review of the classification of the coca leaf, denouncing the colonial and racist biases of its prohibition and calling for its cultural revaluation. These initiatives point to a new paradigm of shared responsibility, which recognizes that the solution does not lie in militarizing producer territories, but in addressing the structural causes of drug trafficking, such as poverty, inequality, and exclusion.

In contrast, the European Union maintains a fragmented and contradictory position. Although its 2021–2025 Drugs Strategy is one of the most progressive in the world in terms of its declarations, it is not binding, and actual policy remains subordinate to security considerations. The transfer of powers to the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG Home) in 2016 consolidated a punitive shift, reducing the institutional capacity dedicated to health and prevention.

Programs such as COPOLAD III and PacCTO2, although promoted as mechanisms for bi-regional cooperation, reflect this structural asymmetry. According to EU-LAC Policy Brief No. 12 on “Drugs, Ports, and Other Challenges,” these initiatives have strengthened technical capacities and coordination channels, but remain anchored in a paradigm of supply control and port security, without questioning the prohibitionist model that generates illicit flows. The report emphasizes that the programs privilege localized successes in interdiction and port control—in Antwerp, Hamburg, or Rotterdam—but do not alter the financial structure of drug trafficking or reduce social and territorial vulnerabilities in Latin America.

The same document proposes that effective bi-regional cooperation should be based on dismantling the financial structures of organized crime and addressing territorial vulnerabilities in producing areas in Latin America, which would reduce the damage caused by supply control strategies.

2. Towards a bi-regional agenda based on evidence and a fairer approach

 Overcoming this trap requires redefining the terms of cooperation. Instead of perpetuating dependence on technical and control projects, a true CELAC-EU agenda should focus on two fundamental axes.

First, the agenda should focus on strengthening technical cooperation by dismantling the financial structures that sustain trafficking. As emphasized in the report referenced above, law enforcement agencies must prioritize the tracking of illicit income and attack the money laundering and corruption circuits that allow the business to persist. This implies shifting the focus from the most visible links to the financial, business, and political networks that sustain it.

Second, this space should be used to redefine political cooperation. Countries in both regions should cooperate with Colombia to take advantage of dissent in the CND and promote more ambitious reforms, enable high-level political dialogue that recognizes the limitations of the prohibition system, and encourage the panel of experts to provide opportunities for real transformation. Support for programs in the field should focus on reducing the territorial vulnerabilities of Latin American production areas. 

Only an approach based on real co-responsibility, financial transparency, and institutional reform will allow progress toward fair cooperation. The EU has an opportunity here to move from rhetoric to coherence: supporting the panel reviewing the international regime promoted by Colombia and joining the reclassification of the coca leaf promoted by Bolivia would be a decisive political gesture within the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and other key multilateral spaces.

Conclusion

CELAC-EU cooperation on drugs remains trapped in an asymmetrical framework, with Europe acting as judge and Latin America as a testing ground. If the Santa Marta Summit aims to mark a turning point, it must recognize that it is not a question of “fighting drugs,” but of dismantling the economic and political structures that sustain them. Committing to financial traceability, evidence-based regulation, and territorial justice would be a true sign of maturity for a bi-regional alliance that aspires to leave behind half a century of punitive failures.